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In the late nineteenth century, several events brought the United States into conflict with 
the nation of Spain. Cuba stood at the center. The dubious fate of a ship in a Cuban port sparked 
a wave of belligerent rhetoric in the United States, amplified by a sensationalist press, and 
American policymakers were forced to seriously consider the results of an international war 
against the Spanish empire. Revolutionaries in the southern Cuban hinterlands clamored for 
American support, desperate to overthrow the Spanish. The ship, however, was not the U.S.S. 
Maine and the war never came about. The year was 1873, not 1898, and the vessel that served as 
the center of potential conflict was a private trading vessel named the Virginius.  
Hired by Cuban émigrés in New York to run arms and ammunition to Cuban 
insurrectionists rebelling against the imperial control of Spain, the Virginius ran from New York, 
to Mobile, Alabama, to Cuba to drop off men and munitions to the rebels in Eastern Cuba. In 
1873, however, a Spanish ship named the Tornado captured the Virginius in the Caribbean. 
Many of the Virginius’s crew were executed. When news of the killings came to the United 
States, many clamored for war. Newspaper headlines called for a belligerent response to Spain’s 
brutality, protesters organized across the nation in support of war, and many politicians agitated 
for an immediate hostile reaction. War, of course, never came about. The newly in power 
Republican government of Spain, headed by President Emilio Castelar, instead resolved the 
affair in tandem with the U.S. State Department, working in Washington to decide on an 
adequate repayment for the executions and the “slight on American honor.”1 Twenty-five years 
later, when the U.S.S. Maine exploded in Havana, soldiers on their way to Cuba often cried out 
“remember the Virginius” as often as they called for the Maine.2  
                                                
1 Foreign Relations of the United States: Spain, 1874, 1001-1002. 
2 Richard H. Bradford, The Virginius Affair, (Boulder: Colorado Associated University Press, 1980), 1-2 
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The history of this event has been obscured by powerful trends in the historiography. 
Despite the importance of the Virginius Affair in shaping U.S.-Spanish relations in the late 
nineteenth century, the imbroglio receives little to no mention in the three interlocking fields that 
one would expect treatment of the event: the history of U.S.-Spanish Relations; American 
history; and Cuban history.  
American relations with Spain in the nineteenth century have long been seen as relatively 
unimportant. Between 1821 – when Mexico established independence from Spain – and 1898 – 
when the U.S. finally engaged the peninsula in the War of 1898 – scholars have consistently 
overlooked American foreign relations with Spain. When rarely examined, books on the subject 
often see U.S.-Spanish relations through a forward-looking lens: examining the events of the 
1880s and 1890s solely as precursors to America’s war with Spain.3 The political, social, and 
economic conflicts between Spain and the United States, while necessarily leading to the war 
near the turn of the century, remained contingent and critical events unto themselves and deserve 
study divorced from 1898. As one of these, the Virginius Affair marks a unique point in the 
relations between the two nations, divided and eventually reconciled over the future of Cuba.  
By examining the history of the Virginius Affair as a contingent event in a history that is 
often seen as inevitable, this paper also challenges a long running set of themes in histories of 
U.S. empire. Coined by historian Richard Hofstadter, scholars often term America’s venture into 
colonial empire in 1898 as a “psychic crisis,” a temporary and unusual event in American history 
divorced from past precedent.4 America, he argued, gained an empire almost by accident. By the 
                                                
3 For an example of one of the few books that examines U.S.-Spanish relations in the nineteenth century, see 
Rodrigo Botero, Ambivalent Embrace: America’s Troubled Relations with Spain from the Revolutionary War to the 
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early 1950s, when Hofstadter coined the term, economists had concluded that empires were 
economically backwards, restrictive in a global market of capital. Hofstadter wrote, “any 
interpretation of America’s entry upon the paths of imperialism in the nineties in terms of 
rational economic motives would not fit the facts.”5 In this conception, empire was simply not 
economically sound. Therefore the imperialist advocates in the United States who saw the 
acquisition of colonies as an imperial stepping-stone to the China Market were irrational. Once 
America actually acquired colonies in the Philippines, Hofstadter concluded, Americans swept 
away from the malaise of imperialism and economic rationality reasserted itself.  
Later New Left historians like Walter LaFeber and William Appleman Williams harshly 
criticized Hofstadter arguing that America held longstanding imperial attitudes.6 However these 
new historians tacitly maintained the exceptionalism of 1898 by instead proffering an 
“internalization thesis”: arguing that the United States between 1865 and 1898 insulated and 
internalized its manufacturing and trade before bursting out onto the world stage in 1898. This 
thesis, which corroborates the exceptionality of the 1890s, remains largely intact to the present 
day in books on U.S. empire.7 Occurring twenty years before the “psychic crisis” could 
purportedly take hold, the Virginius Affair suggests the extreme contingency of American 
imperial expansion.8 The 1890s did not necessarily require imperial expansion for the United 
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States, and the narration of such opportunities stands as the only way to preclude the teleology of 
an American rise to power in the twentieth century that remains so dominant in U.S. history. 
Similar to the United States historiography, Cuban history also suffers from an enduring 
teleological focus tethered to 1898. For decades scholarship on Cuban history has seen 1898 as 
one of a few key missed opportunities in history. Older histories paint the 1895 revolution 
against Spain as a heroic narrative of multiracial resistance against a patriarchal, racist, and 
oppressive imperial state. New works in the field have nuanced this account, with a series of 
works emphasizing the importance of both colony and metropole in shaping the Cuban 
revolution.9 These new histories argue that Cuban history can only be understood in relationship 
with Spain, inverting the postcolonial critique of European history that demanded the 
consideration of colonies when discussing metropoles. While such works have moved past the 
valorizing teleology of the 1895 revolution, scholars like Christopher Schmidt-Nowara, Ada 
Ferrer, and David Sartorius still remain wary of including the United States in any narrative on 
Cuba before 1898. Perhaps seeking to emphasize Spain’s primacy in the imperial relationship, 
these scholars almost entirely obscure the role of American trade and politics in the Caribbean 
before 1898.  
This by no means is an attempt to downplay the importance of Spanish or domestic 
politics in shaping Cuban history, but the ossified national and imperial categories accepted by 
historians in both the United States and Cuba have obscured the more fluid and interconnected 
networks of trade, culture, and politics in the Caribbean. To rectify this oversight, this paper 
adopts and adapts the argument of Matthew Pratt Guterl’s American Mediterranean to move 
                                                
9 See Ada Ferrer, Insurgent Cuba: Race, Nation, and Revolution, 1868-1898 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
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beyond national borders and boundaries in our understanding of the Caribbean during this time. 
Guterl’s work, which focuses on southern American slaveholders’ imagined connection with 
global slaveholding, seeks to “recast the nineteenth-century U.S. South as a messy, complicated 
borderland of sorts between North America and the Caribbean.”10 This conception of the 
Caribbean as borderlands can be best demonstrated through the very vessels involved in the 
Virginius Affair. By tracing the complex interwoven connection of two ships, the Virginius and 
the Tornado, this paper seeks to reveal the broader interconnectedness of empires, nations, and 
people in the Caribbean during the nineteenth century, and thus challenge the stringent categories 
held within nationalist histories. 
 
From Virgin to Virginius: Civil War and Revolution 
Ships were the lifeblood of the Atlantic world. While the nineteenth century brought 
waves of technological advancements – from the telegraph to the steam powered engine – ships 
still dominated the daily lives of those on ports or in the Caribbean. Between 1860 and 1873, 
Spain, the U.S., and Cuba would all find reasons to buy and capture warships to further their 
national interests, necessitated by the changing politics of the Caribbean. Two of these, traded 
between each of these powers at one point or another, would become the foci for the Virginius 
Affair. 
Following secession, one of the Confederate States of America’s first policies called for 
the construction of a navy in order to solidify control over the Caribbean and repel any blockade 
attempts from the Union.11 Although the British Parliament tarried over official recognition of 
                                                
10 Matthew Pratt Guterl, American Mediterranean: Southern Slaveholders in the Age of Emancipation (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2001, 2013), 2. 
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University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 85. 
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the Confederacy, British shipbuilders responded to the call with gusto. On the river Clyde in 
Glasgow, Scotland shipbuilder Aitken Mansel began constructing blockade-runners and warships 
for the new Confederate States. Two ships from his docks, originally named the Virgin and the 
C.S.S. Texas, would endure much longer than the war they were intended for. 
One of these newly built boats would become the very ship captured in 1873 by the 
Spanish. Built in 1864 by Mansel’s firm, the Virgin was a single mast, single deck, round stern 
steamer sold to Miles T. Steele of Louisiana – duty free it might added as well. Acting on behalf 
of the Confederacy, Steele instructed the ship to sail for New Orleans, where it was restocked as 
a blockade-runner. Running the Union blockade from Mobile, Alabama to Havana, Cuba, the 
Virgin brought foreign supplies through the Gulf of Mexico and to Confederate outposts along 
the Mississippi. As the Confederate war effort waned, however, Union ships finally captured the 
Virgin on April 12, 1865.12 The ship remained in dry-dock for several years, property of the 
newly unified United States. Events in the Caribbean would soon necessitate the Virgin’s return 
to action. 
In 1868, revolution broke out in Cuba. Meeting at the house of wealthy plantation owner 
Carlos Manuel Cespedes, several dozen Cuban landowners proclaimed independence for their 
nation from Spain.13 Buoyed by economic support from Cuban expatriates in New York, these 
Cuban revolutionaries castigated Spain for their continuance of slavery, excessive taxes, and the 
isolationist imperial policy enforced on Cuba.14 Either unable or unwilling to send troops to the 
eastern provinces, where Cespedes’ troops began to seize Spanish forts, the Spanish government 
instead created a force of native soldiers named the Voluntarios (Volunteers). The Voluntarios 
                                                
12 Foreign Relations of the United States: Spain, 1874, 1001-1002. 
13 Hermino Portell Vila, Cespedes: El Padre de la Patria Cubana, (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1931), 72-78. 
14 FRUS, Spain, 1874, 844. See also Ada Ferrer, Insurgent Cuba: Race, Nation, and Revolution, 1868-1898 (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 8-46. 
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tried to stamp out rebellion through increasingly violent means.15 With swift regime changes 
back in Madrid undermining imperial authority, the Voluntarios began to brutally execute any 
Cubans who sought to support Cespedes’ rebels. Voluntarios executed women and children in 
Havana suspected of housing rebel sympathies, forced citizens in the streets of Havana to sing 
Viva Espana on pain of death, and would frequently commit acts of mass violence simply to 
discourage further rebel support.16 Horrified by the atrocities, the government in Madrid 
appointed a new Captain-General to oversee military action in Cuba. Upon arriving in Havana in 
June, 1869, the Voluntarios forced him to leave. Each successive colonial governor essentially 
became a puppet for the military authority of the Voluntarios, and Madrid had no choice but to 
accept the arrangement. 
After two years of fighting and conflict, the Cuban revolution slowly shifted from 
insurgent war to a more traditional military conflict. Barricaded in eastern Cuba, the 
revolutionary forces set up a provisional government and elected Cespedes as their president and 
Cespedes’ brother-in-law, Manuel Quesada, as commander-in-chief of the revolutionary forces. 
The new government even printed its own money.17 Settled along regional boundaries, the war 
became a stalemate, continually drawing off Spanish and Cuban resources. To force the issue, 
many Cubans sought outside aid to bring the conflict to an end. Manuel Quesada travelled to 
Washington in April 1870 to obtain aid for his soldiers by any means necessary. Under orders 
from Cespedes, Quesada contacted the “Central Republican Junta of Cuba and Puerto Rico” in 
New York, led by Jose Morales Lemus and Francisco Adama. Supplied with money and 
American contacts by the Junta leaders, Quesada contracted James F. Patterson, an American 
                                                
15 Daniel Sickles to Hamilton Fish, August 26, 1871. Consular Dispatches from Spain, National Archives at 
Waltham. Box 3, roll 4. 
16 For a full, if extremely biased, contemporary account of violence committed by the Voluntarios, see, Book of 
Blood (1873) by the Cuban Junta of New York. 
17 Bradford, The Virginius Affair, 10. 
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with Cuban sympathies, to purchase the Virgin from the Washington Navy Yard for the sum of 
$9,800.18 Signed and notarized documents, later found by the U.S. Solicitor General to discredit 
the Virginius’ claims of American protection, falsely recorded Patterson as the sole purchaser of 
the ship. Outfitting the ship with a crew of international sailors from New York, the newly 
renamed Virginius began one of many treks down to Cuba to outfit and supply Quesada’s rebel 
troops. 
 
From C.S.S. Texas to Tornado: Spanish Upheaval and the Continued Importance of 
Empire 
While 1868 signaled the start of violent revolutionary conflict in Cuba, a more quiet and 
sedate revolution began in Spain. In September 1868 a loose coalition of Spanish Liberals, 
Republicans, and moderates with the effective support of the army under Generals Francisco 
Serrano and Juan Prim overthrew Queen Isabella II and instituted the first system of government 
in Spain in over half a century not controlled by the Bourbon dynasty. The revolutionaries 
dubbed the Spanish Liberal Revolution “La Gloriosa” (The Glorious). While the reasons for 
revolution are always many, lack of economic reform stood as one of the most consistent 
complaints of the Liberal and Republican parties that inspired the revolt. 
Starting in 1864, the Spanish economy began to decline precipitously. Newspapers and 
agitators in Spain blamed the high tariff put in place by the government for the economic 
malaise. By 1868, the wavering Queen Isabella had failed to support either the Liberal or 
Republican platforms for national tariff reform, and instead increased the policy of protectionism 
                                                
18FRUS, Spain, 1874, 1002. 
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put in place by her predecessors.19 Responding to the widespread economic downturn, members 
of the “escuela economista”, a group of liberal economists based in Madrid, began to advocate 
the institution of radical free trade measures, as had been put into place in Britain almost half a 
century earlier which lowered or eradicated the high tariffs domestically and in Britain’s 
colonies.20 Following the revolution, General Serrano and the prominent leaders from the 
Republican and Liberal parties looked to the escuela economista for economic guidance. 
As the revolutionary ideology behind “La Gloriosa” faded away, the years of 1869-1875 
led to swift regime changes in the Spanish government. The Liberal party, which had been 
temporarily overwhelmed by revolutionary Republicans, returned to power in 1870, following 
the coronation of Italian Prince Amadeo of Savoy as the new King Amadeo I of Spain. Backed 
by industrial interests, the Liberal party sought to reinstate a protective industrial tariff. 
Amadeo’s Chief Minister of Finance, Laureano Figuerola, was quickly overwhelmed in trying to 
implement the radical economic policies advocated by the escuela economista, which still found 
favor among the Spanish populace, while simultaneously pleasing the dominant Liberal party. 
Attempting to satisfy both, Figuerola instituted a mildly reformed tariff. One American magazine 
at the time recounted the response to this event, writing: 
Since the Revolution, Figuerola, the Finance Minister, has lowered the tariff, and 
diminished the differential duties in favor of foreign flags. It is too early, as yet, to 
know what improvements this may have produced; but Figuerola’s mild free trade 
innovations have been met by furious opposition; and although well meaning, he 
cannot be called a successful finance minister. He was obliged to retire in the face 
of the overwhelming difficulty of making both ends meet.21 
 
Figuerola attempted to open up domestic Spanish trade to foreign products and investment, 
however he garnered little support among the powerful players in Spanish politics.  
                                                
19 Antonio Tena Junguito, “Tariff History Lessons from the European Periphery Protection Intensity and the Infant 
Industry Argument in Spain and Italy, 1870-1930,” Historical Social Research 35 (2010), 357. 
20 Joseph Harrison, “The Economic History of Spain since 1800,” The Economic History Review 43 (1990), 84. 
21 “Spain, and Her Revolution”, The Eclectic Magazine of Foreign Literature, April 1871, 13. 
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Although Spain’s domestic economy vacillated between free trade and protectionism 
during the decade, this ambiguity did not extend to the commercial interests which most 
interested American manufacturers and investors in the nineteenth century: Spain’s Caribbean 
imperial possessions. Cuba in particular remained under an extremely high protective tariff 
during the 1870s, and many Spanish policymakers sought to actively increase protectionism in 
the colonies as a means of deterring growing American influence.22 Following the loss of the 
Latin American colonies in the 1820s, historians have carefully followed the increasingly 
important relationship construed by the Spanish towards their Antillean colonies.23Although the 
government of Spain would change four times over the decade, the principal aims of Spanish 
diplomacy in the western hemisphere would continue to be the maintenance of their colonies. 
Patrolling the waters of the Caribbean for bootleggers and filibusters became the highest priority 
of the Spanish navy.  
Constructed eight months before the Virgin on the same river Clyde in Scotland, the 
Tornado was originally named the CSS Texas. As its name would suggest, the Confederacy 
contracted the CSS Texas as a steam cruiser raider. Delays in its production, however, led to a 
two-year postponement of commission.24 By the time Mansel had fitted the ship for battle, 
General Lee had already surrendered at Appomattox.  
With the Confederacy dissolved, the British government seized the ship lying in dry-dock 
and sold it to the nation of Chile, embroiled in the Chincha Islands War with Spain. Its Chilean 
                                                
22 James W. Cortada, Spain and the American Civil War: Relations at Mid-Century, 1855-1868,” Transactions of 
the American Philosophical Society 70 (1980), 102. 
23 See, in particular, Christopher Schmidt-Nowara, Empire and Antislavery: Spain, Cuba, and Puerto Rico, 1833-
1874 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1999); and David Sartorius, Ever Faithful: Race, Loyalty, and the 
Ends of Empire in Spanish Cuba (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014). 
24 FRUS: Spain 1874, 997. 
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purchasers renamed it the Pampero.25 Embarking from Glasgow, the newly dubbed Pampero 
never made it to its destination in Chile. The Spanish government, desperate to maintain a 
semblance of order among its former colonies, made the capture of all warships destined for 
Chile the highest priority.26 In 1870, Spanish warships captured the Pampero off the coast of 
Madeira. Again renamed, the Pampero became the Tornado and Madrid tasked the ironclad as a 
screw corvette with a mission to patrol the Caribbean. The Tornado’s patrol throughout the 
Cuban revolution mostly took the form of capturing filibustering ships, like the Virginius, and 
would eventually lead to the affair itself.27 
 
Tracing the Affair: A Microhistorical Narrative of the Virginius and the Tornado 
By 1873 the Virginius had already acquired a treasonous reputation among Spanish naval 
commanders. For three years, between 1870 and 1873, Quesada continued to sail the Virginius 
around the Caribbean drafting soldiers, picking up supplies, and fleeing from Spanish ships that 
patrolled the waters around Cuba. During this time, the ship acquired a criminal reputation 
among Spanish policymakers and the commander of the Voluntarios in Cuba.28 The Virginius 
made dozens of treks between Cuba, New York, and Mobile, Alabama. Supplied by locally hired 
vessels within American waters, the Virginius served as the final link in a military supply line 
leading back to the Cuban Junta leaders in New York. Whenever the Virginius sailed in the 
Caribbean, however, it flew the American flag, a potent protection against Spanish naval 
commanders wary of starting a war with the United States. Entreaties by the Spanish government 
for the United States to disavow the Virginius fell on deaf ears in the State Department. Spain 
                                                
25 Jack Greene, Ironclads at War: The Origin and Development of the Armored Battleship, (Cambridge: Da Capo 
Press, 1998), 276. 
26 FRUS: Spain 1874,, 999 
27 Richard H. Bradford, The Virginius Affair, (Boulder: Colorado Associated University Press, 1980), 28. 
28 Daniel Sickles to Hamilton Fish, November 5th, 1873.  
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also made several pleas to the national governments of Colombia and Venezuela, where the 
Virginius often made port, to detain the vessel. International legal precedent was ambiguous. In a 
time of war, any ship carrying war materiel could be captured as contraband. As Venezuela and 
Colombia had both recognized Cuban belligerency, the voyages of the Virginius would seem to 
be wartime supplying missions. The American ministers in Venezuela and Colombia defended 
against these claims by defending the Virginius as an American ship, and all such ships had a 
right to ply their wares anywhere within the Caribbean.29 In late July, this type of free trade 
protection offered by the American flag came into hostile conflict with the Spanish empire. 
 Fleeing from another Spanish warship, the Virginius docked in Kingston in early July of 
1873 to effect repairs to its overheating boiler. The ship stayed at the port for repairs until mid-
October. Before the crew had fully repaired the ship, another Junta supported ship, the Atlas, 
docked in Kingston carrying more munitions and prospective soldiers to be shipped to Cuba 
immediately.  
 While the military cargo of the Atlas was unremarkable, its passengers destined for Cuba 
were a curious collection of soldiers. Led by Cuban General Bernabe Varona, nicknamed 
Bembetta, the soldiers were mostly Cuban expatriates who had joined in the expedition out of 
loyalty to their revolutionary comrades. Among the Cubans, however, was a lanky white man 
who styled himself as General William Ryan, a Canadian filibusterer. Ryan was actually 
Lieutenant George Washington Ryan, an Irish immigrant to Canada who fought in the U.S. Civil 
War with a New York infantry regiment. Ryan had joined the expedition in New York, dreaming 
of the potential economic gains made possible by Cuban independence. Another passenger on 
the Atlas, Joseph Fry, had had a different experience in the U.S. Civil War. Fry had sailed 
blockade-runners for the Confederacy. Replacing another American captain who had fled in 
                                                
29 FRUS, Spain, 1872, 140, 156-158. 
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Jamaica, the New York Junta had hired Fry, who had military experience with ships like the 
Virginius. Outfitted with new repairs, soldiers, and an experienced captain, the Virginius began 
its final trek towards Cuba where it would be finally captured by the Tornado. 
 On the morning of October 30th, the Virginius departed from the harbor at Kingston and 
steamed towards Cuba carrying its new complement of men and munitions. While Ryan, who 
had self-breveted himself a General in the Cuban army, trained some of the soldiers on the deck, 
the newly appointed Captain Fry sought to keep the leaking ship in one piece until they could 
reach the relative safety of Bocco de Cabello and effect more repairs. Six miles from the Cuban 
coast, within sight of Guantanamo, the patrolling Tornado sighted the leaking steamboat. 
 Captained by Dionisio Costilla, the Tornado’s patrols were always on the lookout for 
blockade-runners in the area, and the Virginius was one of the most notorious. The details of the 
ship had been relayed to Costilla when he first took his post, and his watchmen spotted the ship 
off the coast, identifying its twin masts and matching twin steamers.30 As soon as his watchmen 
informed Costilla of the Virginius’s presence, he gave chase. The Virginius, battered and 
overused, had only one realistic option: flee. For several miles, the Virginius crept away from the 
shoreline, trying to lose the onrushing Tornado in the open sea. Once within range, the Tornado 
fired four cannon shots across the Virginius scoring two hits on the cable lines holding up the 
ship’s sails. With the ship’s boilers stoked to near bursting, and the sails losing slack, Captain 
Fry recognized the impossible circumstances they were put in. He ordered the ship’s engines 
turned off. Ryan, Bembetta, Quesada, and Fry gathered the men under the only realistic 
protection they had left, the safety offered by the American flag which still flew over the topsail. 
 Eager to capture the ship, Costilla ordered a boarding party to take the Virginius. As 
Spanish troops swarmed aboard the Virginius, Bembetta ordered his troops to stand aside. The 
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crew and passengers were searched, stripped, and tied down on the deck while several more 
enthusiastic Spanish soldiers climbed the mast and tore down the American flag which had 
protected the Virginius from capture for years. Raising the Spanish colors on the ship, the 
boarders stomped on the flag, tearing it, and spitting on the image that had protected those who 
armed their enemies in Cuba. Seeing this, Ryan remarked to the remaining Cubans, “That means 
war, boys, if we ever get out of this.”31 
 The following day, November 1st, the Tornado towed the Virginius into the harbor of 
Santiago, Cuba where, twenty-five years later, the Spanish fleet would surrender to the victorious 
Americans ending the War of 1898. All of the crew and passengers aboard the Virginius, except 
Ryan, Bembetta, and Quesada, were marched into the city and placed under guard in prison. 
Bembetta and Quesada were well known to the Voluntarios, they had led Cuban forces for years 
against Spain. Ryan, however, was a curious case. He titled himself a general, however he had 
yet to see combat in Cuba. The leader of the Voluntarios, General Burriel, decided that Ryan 
would suffer the same punishment as Quesada and Bembetta. The only possible American 
protection for the captured men came in the form of Emil G. Schmitt, the U.S. vice-consul in 
Santiago. Schmitt’s superior, consul Arthur Young, was vacationing back in the United States, 
and the young vice-consul had only been working in Cuba for a little over a year.32 Once he 
heard of the Virginius’s capture, he attempted to meet with the prisoners and devise some 
strategy to free them. The Voluntarios who guarded the prisoners rebuffed his attempts. For two 
days, Schmitt tried unsuccessfully to contact the prisoners, and he desperately wired Washington 
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for aid or advice. By the time his first wires got through to the State Department, Bembetta, 
Quesada, and Ryan had all been tried in a hasty military tribunal as traitors and pirates.33  
 Early on November 4th, the three men were led out into the streets of Santiago and 
executed by firing squad. Unsurprisingly, the execution of Ryan, a naturalized citizen of Canada 
one of the few white men aboard the Virginius, enraged Schmitt and brought new allies in the 
form of the British consul in Santiago as well as several private British citizens who resided in 
the city. One of these citizens, a man named Theodore Brooks, received guidance from his own 
nearby national authority, the colonial governor in Jamaica. The colonial governor ordered 
Brooks to stop any more killings at once, and gave Brooks the authority of the British crown in 
any requests made to Burriel.34 The general, however, refused any entreaties from Britain or 
America, denying Schmitt and Brooks access to the remaining prisoners. 
 Only a few days later, the remaining prisoners, still languishing in prison, were informed 
that every potential soldier who had arrived with the Virginius, as well as Captain Fry, would be 
tried in a court martial to convene the very same day. Three-dozen men were brought to the 
naval barracks and tried before a court of Spanish commanders. Little evidence remains as to the 
events at the court, but the tribunal sentenced every man to death for their crimes against Spain. 
Jose Autran, the colonel presiding over the tribunal, cited a military code passed at the beginning 
of Cuba’s revolution that stated that, “all vessels captured on the high seas near Cuba with men 
and munitions should be treated as pirates and their crews immediately executed.”35 Not allowed 
any legal defense, Fry and the would-be soldiers were sentenced to death by firing squad. 
 Early the next morning, on November 8th, Fry and the Cubans were marched to the same 
wall where Bembetta, Quesada, and Ryan had met their ends. Under Burriel’s orders, they 
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suffered the same fate. Increasingly frantic, vice-consul Schmitt contacted other national consuls 
in the city, local activists, and waited for any definitive response from Washington.36 The 
following day, ten more of the crew were executed. Finally, as a British cruiser alerted by 
Theodore Brooks pulled into the harbor on November 12th, Burriel guaranteed Brooks and 
Schmitt that no more prisoners would be shot. The damage, however, had been done and the 
events of the affair played out. In less than two weeks, Burriel had ordered the execution of 
roughly fifty men, some of them American and British citizens. The ramifications of Burriel’s 
actions would reverberate throughout the globe. 
 
Resolving the Affair: International Diplomacy and the Contingency of Personal Politics 
 Although the laying of telegraph lines throughout the Caribbean and across the Atlantic 
in the 1860s sped the process of communication exponentially, information still took days to 
travel from Santiago to the United States and Spain. Cut cables and the delayed relaying of 
messages stopped all news of the events in Santiago from reaching Washington until November 
11th. The U.S. Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish – an aristocratic Whig politician from New York 
known for his diplomacy in handling international incidents – received the information on Ryan, 
Quesada, and Bembetta’s executions first, informing then President Ulysses S. Grant that an 
incident had occurred in Cuba. Fish then requested more information on the ship from his 
consuls in Venuzuela and Cuba, who informed him about the Virginius’s clandestine missions to 
Cuba.37 Before he could hear back, Fish and Grant received a cable confirming the thirty-six 
subsequent executions. 
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37 Diary of Hamilton Fish, November 11, 1873. 
18 
 Fish cabled Daniel Sickles, the Ambassador to Madrid, ordering him to, “protest in the 
name of the government and of civilization and humanity, against the act as brutal, barbarous, 
and an outrage upon the age, and declare that this government will demand the most ample 
reparation of any wrong which may have been committed upon ay of its citizens, or upon its 
flag.” For all of his chest thumping, Fish also included a coded postscript. Decoded by Sickles, 
the script read, “You are confidentially informed that grave suspicions exist as to the right of the 
Virginius to carry the American flag, as also with regard to her right to the American papers 
which she is said to have carried.” Considering this, Fish urged Sickles to act in a manner that 
avoided “all appearance of menace.”38   
 The next day, Fish gathered the ministers from France and England, whose colonial or 
trade holdings in the Caribbean necessitated their involvement in resolving the dispute, and met 
with the Spanish minister to the United States, Don Jose Polo de Barnabe, known as Polo. 
Although the meeting remained unrecorded, Fish recalled in his diary that he confronted Polo 
about every possible action that led to the executions. The Secretary of State castigated Burriel’s 
refusal to allow legal aid to the prisoners, the inactivity of the Spanish colonial government in 
Havana, and the hasty military tribunals. Fish suggested that the errors in Cuba were largely due 
to the distant imperial rule held by Spain and, perhaps, to ensure the safety of foreigners in Cuba, 
other nations should be allowed more control within the island.39 While the consuls from France 
and England were involved in the process, Fish’s clearly meant to promote more American 
political and economic involvement on the island. To relieve Spain of the Cuban anti-colonial 
tensions, Fish sought unfettered access to Santiago in order to effect reprisals. Polo responded 
noncommittally, saying he would take Fish’s suggestions to President Castelar in Madrid. 
                                                
38 Hamilton Fish to Daniel Sickles, November 12th, 1873. 
39 Diary of Hamilton Fish, November 13, 1873. 
19 
 On November 14th, Fish met again with the cabinet and Grant. Their first topic was the 
fate of the Virginius and its crew. Again, Fish urged caution claiming that Sickles in Madrid and 
the General Consul in Cuba would need to relay more information before any definitive action 
could be taken by the U.S. While giving his arguments, Fish received another communiqué from 
the island from a member of the American Press Association. The news of the final ten 
executions finally had finally arrived to Washington. The reporter, however, claimed that Burriel 
executed one hundred and eleven of the crew, rather than only ten.40 Similar news came from 
other periodicals and newspapers throughout the nation.41 This update prompted immediate 
action from the cabinet. Before the meeting, Fish had drafted a cable to Sickles ordering the 
general to leave his ministry if Spain had not provided ample explanation or reparations for the 
Virginius Affair.42 He had left the ultimatum on his desk, however the false announcement of 
over one hundred deaths provoked furious reactions from the secretaries. Initially, Fish called for 
Sickles to petition the Spanish government for an explanation of the affairs in Cuba; he assumed 
that the Voluntarios illegally executed the sailors under no orders from Madrid. The cabinet, 
however, urged Fish to castigate Castelar and his ministry for the incident. They agreed upon a 
thirty day embargo before Sickles should protest the Spanish government’s actions, shut down 
the legation in Madrid, and return to the United States and, most likely, to war.43 
 Before those thirty days had concluded Fish and Polo had negotiated a resolution to the 
incident, and presidents Grant and Castelar each agreed to resolve the issue without conflict. The 
Spanish Government, Polo and Castelar agreed, would give an official apology for the 
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desecration of the U.S. flag as well as an indemnity to the families of any American citizens hat 
served as crew on the Virginius. In exchange, the U.S. would maintain the legation in Madrid 
and refuse to recognize the belligerency of the Cuban rebels.44 Fish and Polo sent a joint cable to 
Cuba, ordering Captain-General Jovellar, the leader of the Voluntarios in Havana, to release the 
Virginius from the port in Santiago. Initially, Jovellar had stood by the actions of General Burriel 
in Santiago. Jovellar believed that a war with America in Cuba could help his Voluntarios in 
their battle against the Cuban insurrectionists. When the cable came through to Havana, the 
Cuban general waited for two days, contemplating potential action. On December 11th, he finally 
accepted the terms that had been agreed upon by Polo and Fish. In a public speech, recorded by 
the U.S. General-Consul in Havana, Jovellar claimed that any noncompliance with the agreement 
would, “bring on war, war with great power, and war without the aid of Spain…”45 Jovellar lost 
any hope of reinvigorating the Voluntarios’ war against Cespedes’ Cubans, although his speech 
serves as a crucial reminder of the interconnected worldviews of these actors in this period. 
Although the incident of the Virginius Affair took less than two weeks to play out in 
Santiago, and less than two months for Fish and Polo to resolve, public awareness lasted for 
several months, albeit with massive amounts of misinformation. News filtered sporadically to the 
United States and Madrid and numerous false reports colored the actions of both the U.S. 
government and private citizens. News, both false and true, of the incident would sweep across 
the United States and Spain, igniting fierce controversy over the role that the United States 
should play in world affairs. To curtail such rumors, Presidents Grant and Castelar ordered for a 
joint investigation of the incident, administered by Hamilton Fish. 
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Near the end of December, Fish’s son-in-law Sidney Webster, appointed as lead 
investigator, uncovered the total extent of the Virginius’s extralegal dealings.46 Fish had been 
aware of the general character of the Virginius, informed by his consuls throughout the 
Caribbean, but he quickly repudiated the ship when Webster revealed the years long extent of its 
blockade-running. As the days following the executions turned into weeks, the thundering calls 
for war among the public in America eventually died out.  
A few weeks after the affair, one American reporter commented that, “no war between 
this country and the Spanish Republic is likely to grow out of the Virginius Affair. The 
American people certainly have great reasons to rejoice that war is to be averted, and at the same 
time that our national honor is to be maintained.” The ardent annexationists, the articles 
continued, “will feel chagrined and not a little disgusted at this peaceful issue of the difficulty, 
but the country cannot afford to go to war to gratify this insignificant portion of the 
population.”47 While the sensationalist newspapers turned their attention back to the growing 
economic troubles of the United States and the prosecution of Boss Tweed, the annexationist 
fervor that swept the nation largely dissipated. Fish had steered the immediate official action of 
the U.S. government away from belligerent public opinion. The Virginius Affair had been 
immediately resolved, and any potential military action to be taken by the U.S. or Spain averted.  
In a strange way, however, the Virginius Affair contributed to the hastiness of the War of 
1898. Following the diplomatic resolution of the conflict, Fish called for a reevaluation of 
America’s naval forces. Spearheaded by Secretary of the Navy George Robeson, a long process 
of technological modernization and improvements of America’s aging ironclads began in 1873.48 
                                                
46 For the entirety of the inquiry, see FRUS, Spain, 1873, 990-1022. 
47 “Dissipation of the War Cloud”, Maine Farmer, December 6th, 1873. 
48 George Robeson to Hamilton Fish, February 18, 1874. Hamilton Fish Papers, Library of Congress.  Box 314, 
folder 7. 
22 
By 1898, the American Navy had been thoroughly renovated, and American naval superiority 
quickly disabled Spanish military effectiveness with key raids at Santiago and Manila. This 
relation was not lost upon the agitators for war in 1898. One reporter noted the similarity 
between the potential conflict in 1873 and the mobilization of 1898, writing, “The fleet at Key 
West will be augmented within the day by the arrival of several more gunboats… These and the 
other vessels previously ordered to that point constitute the largest assemblage of war vessels 
made since the Virginius affairs…” Considering the naval might of the United States in 1873, the 
reporter continued, “although formidable in its day, this aggregation was made up of the old style 
wooden ships, monitors which had gone through the civil war…Compared with the modern 
battleships and cruisers of the new navy, it was insignificant…”49 Fearful of the sorry state of 
their own dilapidated navy in contrast to Spain’s in 1873, the Virginius Affair prompted the 
construction of the fleet that would eventually smash Spain’s twenty five years later. In its own 
indirect way, the potential for conflict contained in the Virginius Affair would contribute to the 
eventual war that all sides had so desperately tried to prevent in 1873.50 
 
Conclusion 
Contingency remains one of the most difficult topics of study in history. While war did 
not occur in 1873 over the fate of the Virginius, the conditions of the affair held enormous 
potential for conflict. Through peeling back the layers of teleology that dominate the current 
scholarship on Cuban, Spanish, and American history the microhistorical narrative of the 
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Virginius and the Tornado reveals the narrowness that separates war from peaceful resolution. A 
missed telegraph, a case of mistaken identity, a single bullet could have led to a transatlantic war 
in the 1870s. While such a conflict did not occur, the potential suggests the limitations of the 
valorizing teleologies that dominate nationalist historical projects. By pushing back against the 
institution of nationalized categories of analysis, the tracing of contingency offers new historical 
insight into the networks of connection that bound the Caribbean and those involved in the 
region. 
Most importantly, the travels and routes of the two ships in this study reveal the deeply 
imbricated nature of the Caribbean during this period. Tasked to fight in an American war and 
ultimately ending up as tools for Cuban revolutionaries and the Spanish empire, the Virginius 
and the Tornado served as pieces in the complex borderlands of national, imperial, and 
revolutionary interests in the Caribbean. While the Spanish-American war in 1898 led to longer 
lasting political, social, and cultural consequences for Spain, the U.S., and Cuba, myriad 
conflicts in the preceding decades indicate the importance of historicizing the extranational 
connections of these polities. In other words scholars should – much like the Maine – “remember 
the Virginius.”  
